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English  and Vickrey  Auctions 
I describe a  bit of the  history of auctions,  the two  pairs 
of standard auction forms,  and  the  ideas of dominance 
and  strategic  equivalence. 
1.1  Auctions 
It is hard to  imagine  modern  civilization  without  buying  and  selling, 
which  make  possible  the  division  of  labor  and  its  consequent  wealth 
(Smith, 1776).For manycommon andrelatively inexpensivecommodi­
ties,  the  usual  and  convenient  practice  at  the  retail  level,  in  the  West 
anyway, is  simply for  the  seller to post a  take-it-or-leave-it price,  and 
for  the  prospective  buyer  to  choose  what  to  buy  and  where  to  buy  it, 
perhaps  shopping  for  favorable  prices.  I  haven’t  tried  haggling  over 
price  at  a  Wal-Mart,  but  I  can’t  imagine  it  would  get  me  very  far. 
For  some big-ticket  items,  however,  like  houses  and  cars,  haggling  and 
counteroffers are expected, even in polite society,  and  bargaining  can be 
extended over  many  rounds. In  some  cultures,  haggling is  the rule for 
almost  all  purchases. 
A  third  possibility,  our  subject  here,  is  the  auction,  where  many 
prospective  buyers  compete  for  the  opportunity  to  purchase  items, 
either  simultaneously,  or  over  an  extended  period  of  time.  The  main 
attraction  of  the  auction  is  that  it  can  be  used  to  sell  things  with 
more  or  less  uncertain  market  value,  like  a  tractor  in  a  farmer’s  estate, 
a  manufacturer’s  overrun  of  shampoo,  or  the  ﬁnal  working  copy  of 
Beethoven’sscoreforhisNinthSymphony(seeﬁg. 1.1).Itthuspromises 
to  fetch  as  high  a  price  as  possible  for  the  seller,  while  at  the  same 
time  offering  to  the  buyer  the  prospect  of  buying  items  at  bargain 
prices,  or  perhaps  buying  items  that  would  be  difﬁcult  to  buy  in  any 
other way. When  there is  one  seller,  the  auction is  sometimes  qualiﬁed 
as  a  single  or  one-sided  auction,  to  distinguish  it  from  a  double  or 
two-sided  auction,  where  there  are  many  sellers  (and  by  implication 
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Figure 1.1  Sotheby’s  auctioneer  Roger  Grifﬁths  (left),  conducting  the  auction 
of the  working  manuscript of Beethoven’s  Ninth  Symphony  (right),  which realized 
£2.1  million  ($3.4  million)  in  London,  Thursday  May  22,  2003.  (AP/Wide World 
Photos,  Edmond Terakopian  photographer) 
multiple items) as well as  many buyers. A familiar example of the  latter 
is  a  stock  exchange. 
The kind of  sale where  many sellers compete for  the business of  one 
buyer  is  called  a  reverse  auction.I nm a n yr e s p e c t st h er e v e r s ea u c t i o ni s 
equivalent to  the usual  auction, with  one  seller  and  many buyers. This 
situation  arises,  for example, when we  ask competing  painters for  bids 
topaint our house.Wewillconcentratealmostentirelyonauctionswith 
one  seller  and  many buyers,  the  usual kind of  single  auction. 
The  seller in an  auction is faced  with many  choices. He1  usually sets 
therules,andhemustthereforedecidewhatkindof auctiontohold.For 
1 I  will  adopt  the  convention,  common  in  the  auction  literature,  that  the  ﬁrst 
mentioned  and  subsequent  odd-numbered  buyers  are  female,  and  even-numbered 
buyers are male; for contrast, the ﬁrst (and usually only) seller will be male. Or at  least 
I will try to do  so  when it  isn’t confusing  or  distracting. 
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example, does  the  bidder  indicate her  bid in a public venue by  raising 
a  numbered  paddle  in  assent  to  bids  solicited  orally  by  an  auctioneer 
(an  English  auction); does  she  submit  her bid privately to a  sealed-bid 
auction in which  the winner pays her  bid;  or  the next-highest bid;  or 
does  the  seller  announce  descending  prices  and  sell  to  the  ﬁrst  buyer 
signaling  that she is willing to buy (a  Dutch  2  auction)? The  seller must 
also  then decide on any reserves,  minimum  opening  bids, commissions, 
minimum  bidding  increments (ticks), time  limits,  and  so  on. Usually 
the  seller’s  goal  is  to  maximize  his  revenue,  but  other  considerations 
may  enter  the  picture,  especially  those  that  might  affect  reputation  and 
future  sales. For example, he may be faced with the problem of deciding 
on  the  order  in  which  to  place  several  similar  items  on  the  block.  He 
might even be  interested in who wins what item. 
The  bidder  is  faced  with  different  questions,  the  most  obvious  of 
which  are  how  much  to  bid  and  when.  There  are  also  what  we  might 
call  “externalities’’  involving  other bidders  and  future  sales. Will  there 
be  other  opportunities  to buy  a  similar item? Is resale of  the item a 
consideration?  Does it  matter to  the bidder which  rival might win  and 
what he might pay? Typically  these questions  are complex and involve 
the  interaction  of  different  parties’  strategies. 
Auctions  have  been  widely  used  in  recent  times  on  a  large  scale 
for  selling  such  things  as  bonds,  electromagnetic  spectrum,  oil  and 
timber  rights,  and  surplus  commodities,  usually  involving  businesses 
and  the  government,  but  not  the  average  consumer.  However,  the 
widespread useofthe internet, and especially eBay,hasgreatly increased 
theparticipationofthe general public.Thisgrowinginterestin auctions 
has attracted  the attention of  economists, of course, but  more recently 
has  also  interested  computer  scientists,  who  see  the  auction  not  only  as 
a  means  of  trade,  but  with  a  somewhat  different  coloring  as  an  algo­
rithm  for  allocating  resources,  especially  on  the  internet.  The  rapidly 
growing  literature  is  trying  to  provide  useful  answers  to  the  kinds  of 
questions  raised  above:  What  kinds  of  auctions  are  best  for  which 
2  Caution!  Throughout  the  auction  literature  a  Dutch  auction  is  exactly  this,  a 
descending clock  auction, and we will  stick to  this  usage. But  on eBay,  the term  means 
a sale where multiple copies of  an item are available,  something utterly  different. I have 
no  idea why eBay  chose to commandeer  the term, but  their  usage  sometimes confuses 
students, and might even change the  standard terminology. 
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applications?  How  should  bidders  choose  their  bidding  strategies? 
How  do  bidders  actually  behave  in  real  auctions?  How  do  auctions 
compare to  alternative  mechanisms? Researchers  usually  put  the  study 
of all these  questions under  the general rubric of  “auction  theory,’’ even 
though it  often  involves  the  examination  of  empirical  and  experimental 
evidence  as  well  as  strictly  mathematical  theory. 
Auction  theory  proper  began  with  the  extraordinarily  insightful 
paper  of  Vickrey  in  1961.  As  groundbreaking  and  inﬂuential  as  this 
paper is, it doesn’t require any advanced  mathematics—all  that is really 
needed  is  freshman  calculus.  In  fact,  much  of  Vickrey’s  paper  can  be 
appreciated  with  no  mathematics  at  all,  and you  might  enjoy  reading 
such  a classic. It took a while  for economists to  digest Vickrey’s  ideas, 
and  the  ﬁeld  of  auction  theory  didn’t  really  ﬂower  until  the  1980s, 
a  surprisingly  late  date  in  the  history  of  science  in  general.  It  seems 
that  the  whole  ﬁeld  had  to  wait  for  the  development  of  game  theory 
in  the  1950s,  and  especially  the  remarkably  powerful  concept  of  the 
Nash  equilibrium. This work has  led to  the construction of a  mathemat­
ical  framework  within  which  human  behavior  is  neatly  characterized, 
and  which  serves  at  least  as  a  starting  point  for  the  study  of  real 
behavior. 
While  the  development  of  auction  theory  has  been  a  long  time 
coming  compared  with  the  physical  sciences,  the  development  of  ex­
perimental  economics has  been even  slower. Theory does not  play  the 
same role in  understanding  auctions  as,  say, physics  does in predicting 
the trajectory  of  a  planet. In  the  latter  situation, we  can  gather  enough 
data—the position of Mars  at  different  times,  say—to predict withgreat 
precision,  using  Newton’s  laws  of  motion,  where  it  will  be  at  future 
times.  If  Jupiter  or  an  asteroid  affects  the  orbit  of  Mars,  well,  we  can 
take  that  into account  also,  achieving greater  and greater precision  in 
our  predictions.  On  the  other  hand,  we  can  expect  no  such  convergent 
exactitude  in  auction  theory,  which  is,  after  all,  a  social  science.  The 
situation  is  further  complicated  by  the  fact  that  some  participants  in 
auctions  read  books  about  auction  theory.3  Despite  the  difﬁculties, 
an  active  segment  of  the  research  community,  in  admirable  scientiﬁc 
3  The  self-referential  nature of auction  theory (and  all  social  sciences  like economics) 
is always a problem, but  also  makes life more  interesting. 
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style,  gathers  data  and  studies  its  reconciliation  with  current  theory. 
Generally,  we  can  classify  this  empirical  literature  into  three  categories: 
•	 Laboratory  experiments,  in  which  experimental  subjects  are  en­
listed to  participate in more or  less realistic  auctions; 
•	 Passive collection of real  data from real  auctions, greatly  facilitated 
by the  internet; 
•	 Field experiments, in which the investigator  sells or buys real items 
in  a  real  auction. 
Despite  the  relatively  late  arrival  of  auction  theory  as  a  scientiﬁc 
discipline,  auctions  themselves  have  existed  for  at  least  a  couple  of 
thousand years, and we begin with a bit of their  history. 
1.2  A Brief  History 
I  will  rely  on  Cassady’s  1967  book,  Auctions  and  Auctioneering,f o r 
our  early  history.  He  traveled  the  world  studying  auctions,  especially 
those for  ﬁsh, which  need to be  marketed  and  distributed  quickly  and 
regularly. His book, although not  quantitative or mathematical at all, is 
a valuable compendium of  sharply and  carefully  observed details of the 
auction process, from all angles, and  across  many cultures, as it existed 
before  the  internet. It still  makes  enlightening reading. 
Auctions were conducted  at  least  as  early  as  500 B.C., when women 
were  sold  in  ancient  Babylon—on  condition  that  they  be  wed.4  By 
Romantimes, auctionswereevidentlywell established, beingconducted 
in  their  own  special  building  (the  atrium  auctionarium).  There  isn’t 
much  known about  exactly how  these auctions were conducted, but  as 
Cassady  points  out,  the  fact  that  the  word  “auction’’  is  derived  from 
the  Latin  word  auctus,  an  increase,  suggests  that  these  were  ascending-
price  auctions,  which,  when  conducted  openly  with  a  congregation  of 
bidders,  are  now  called  English  auctions. 
One  infamous  auction during Roman times is  described by Edward 
Gibbon  in  his  Decline and Fall of  the Roman Empire  (1776). When  the 
4 With  this  condition,  undesirable  women  were  sold  in  return  for  payment  of 
dowries, to  the lowest bidder, thus providing  an  early example of  a  reverse  auction  (see 
question  2). 
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Figure 1.2  Bronze  sestertius  of  Didius  Julianus,  high  bidder  for  the 
Roman  Empire  in  193  A.D.  (Classical  Numismatic  Group,  Inc.) 
Praetorian  Guard  killed  the  Roman  emperor  Pertinax  on  March  28, 
193  a.d.,  they  sold  the Roman Empire  itself to  the  highest  bidder,  the 
wealthy  senator  Didius  Julianus,  who  “rose  at  once  to  the  sum  of  six 
thousand two hundred and  ﬁfty drachms, or upwards of  two hundred 
pounds  sterling’’  per  man  (Gibbon,  1776).5  The  new  emperor  lasted 
only  two months,  but  did  manage to strike some very handsome coins 
(see  ﬁg.  1.2  and  question  3). 
Auction  houses  were  common  in  England  in  the  late  1600s,  selling 
paintings and  ships, for example,  although it is not  necessarily the  case 
that  these were conducted as “English’’  auctions. The ﬁrms of Sotheby’s 
and  Christie’s,  now  well  known  as  prestigious  auction  houses,  were 
5 An  example  of “jump  bidding’’  in  the  second  century,  about  which,  more  below. 
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founded  in  1744  and  1766,  respectively.  The  institution  of  auctions 
naturally  migrated  to  America,  where  Cassady  reports  that  they  were 
often  used  to  unload  leftover  inventory,  and  were  usually  regarded  as 
discreditable proceedings.  This  spectrum of  auction  ware, ranging from 
the dregs to  the most coveted items, continues to  his day. Perhaps  the 
most well  known—and  odious—early  auctions in America entailed the 
sale  of  slaves.  Here,  it  seems  that  some  form  of  the  familiar  English 
auction  was  used. 
Auctions of fruits  and vegetables  became  established in  the Nether­
lands  around  1880,  and  grew  to  a  vast  system  of  markets  for  horti­
cultural  goods,  associated today  especially with  tulips, mainly because 
of  the  phenomenon  of  “tulipmania’’  reported  so  vividly  by  Charles 
Mackay  (1841).6  About  the  same  time,  the  selling  of  ﬁsh  by  auction 
became  important in  Germany. What is  critical  here is  the  fact  that  ﬁsh 
must  be  sold  fast! 
Ancient  coins,7  stamps,  and  similar  collectible  items  and  objets  d’art 
were  sold  by  regularly  established  auction  houses  by  the  late  1800s, 
and  the  important  sales were usually  accompanied by nicely produced 
and  illustrated  catalogs,  many  of  which  are  still  used  as  references 
today.  Glossy  auction  catalogs  began to  include invitations for  bidding 
by  mail,  to  allow  potential  buyers  to  compete  even  if  they  could  not 
attend  the  sale  or  send  a  representative.  The  rules  here  are  often  vague, 
but  seem  to  suggest  that  the  auctioneer  will  treat  the  mail  bid  as  a 
limit,  and  bid  for  the  mail  bidder  at  appropriate  points  in  the  sale.8 
No  later  than  the  1870s  (Lucking-Reiley,  2000b),  auctions  developed 
that  were  conducted  entirely  by  mail,  and  the  rules  for  these  were 
often  spelled  out  in  some  detail,  although  ambiguity  in  stating  the 
exact  rules  for  auctions  is  always  a  potential  problem  for  the  bidders 
(and  perhaps a proﬁtable  strategy for  sellers). We will  discuss  mail-bid 
sales  more  later  on;  they  fall  in  the  category  of  sealed-bid  auctions— 
that  is,  auctions  in  which  each  bidder’s  bid  is  submitted  to  the  seller 
privately. 
6 We’ll return  this classic example of a price  bubble in chapter 6. 
7 I will often draw  on  ancient coins  for examples of  collectibles  commonly sold by 
auction. 
8  Cassady (1967,  pp.  152ff) discusses  this practice in  some  detail,  calling  the bids  for 
absentees  “book bids.’’ 
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This  brings  us  to  the  present  day.  The  internet  is  spectacularly  well 
suited for conducting  auctions, because it  allows an  enormous number 
of potential  bidders and  sellers to be put in  fast communication at  very 
small  cost.  It  was  therefore  inevitable  that  internet  auctions  became 
important—but  it  was  not  so  easy  to  see  that  one  auction  site  (eBay 
of  course)  would  come  to  dominate  all  others  by  a  wide  margin.9  In 
retrospect,  it  seems  obvious  that  an  early  capture  of  market  share  is 
self-reenforcing.  Once  a  venue  is  established  that  attracts  buyers  who 
know  and  trust  the  process,  it  attracts  sellers,  then  more  buyers,  and 
on  it  goes.  At  this  point,  eBay  seems  to  have  a  lock  on  many  of  the 
important auctionmarkets, especiallycollectibles.TherulesofeBayand 
how  they  are  especially  suited  to  the  internet  environment  will  be  one 
of  our  recurring  themes. 
1.3  English  Auctions 
Considernowthe mostcommonkindof auctionbeforetheinternet,the 
English  auction. An  auctioneer  stands  on a raised  dais  and  asks  for bids 
(ﬁgs.  1.1  and  1.3),10  “What  am I  offered for  this  important  van Gogh 
portrait?’’  “One  million,  one  million,  do  I  hear  one  million  and  one 
hundred  thousand?’’  The requests  for bids  are  interspersed with  patter 
praising  the virtues of  the item in  more or less colorful terms. When no 
one  is  willing  to  meet  the  next  requested  level,  we  hear  the  inevitable, 
“ G o i n g ,g o i n g ,...g o n e ! ’ ’a n d  t h eg a v e lf a l l st os i g n a lt h ec l o s eo f  t h e 
sale.11 How  are we to  think of  this process in quantitative terms? How 
can we decide what constitutes a good strategy for buyers or  sellers? 
It  turns  out  that  our  intuition  usually  serves  us  well  when  bidding 
in  an  English  auction. Consider  the  thought  processes  involved during 
the  bidding.  Somehow  we  have  in  mind,  either  explicitly  or  more  or 
9 Japan and  China, however, are signiﬁcant exceptions. See question 5. 
10 Bids in an English auction  can be  indicated to the auctioneer in  many ways,  such 
as raising a  paddle, raising a  hand,  or  just  nodding. Sometimes  bids come in  the form 
of  prearranged  signals  that  can  be  so  complex  that  the  auctioneer  loses  track  of  who  is 
biddingwhat.Cassady(1967)hasanamusingandinstructive discussionofcomplicated 
and confused signaling and why bidders may be  anxious to  hide their  identity. 
11 Thus,  the  ﬁnal price  achieved  at  auction is  sometimes  called  the  “hammer’’ price. 
8 ENGLISH AND VICKREY AUCTIONS 
Figure 1.3  “Christie’s  Auction  Room,’’  drawn  and  engraved  by  A.  Pugin 
and T.  Rowlandson,  aquatint by J.  Bluck, from  The Microcosm of London, 
R.  Ackermann,  London,  1808.  Compare  this  with  ﬁgure  1.1. Very  little  has 
changed  in  this  kind  of  auction  for  at  least  two  hundred  years.  (Christie’s 
Images  Ltd.) 
less  vaguely,  the  highest  amount  we  might  be  willing  to  pay  for  the 
item. We  call this  our  value,  or,  sometimes,  interchangeably,  valuation. 
If  the  bidding  level  is  below  our  valuation  and  we  are  not  the  highest 
bidder, we bid up a  small  amount from the  current level. Usually,  there 
is a  minimum increment  demanded by the  auctioneer, to speed up the 
process. We stop  either when the competition drops out when  our own 
bid  is  the  highest,  or  when  the  bidding  level  exceeds  our  valuation. 
Simply  put, we  bid up, gradually, to  the  most we  are willing to pay,  and 
no higher. We  call such  a strategy  truthful or  sincere  bidding  because  we 
drop  out at  our true  value. 
So  much  for  the  rational  story,  but  there  are  already  important 
problems  with  this  picture  of  human  behavior.  This  model  assumes, 
ﬁrst of  all,  that we  are certain of  our  valuation to begin with,  and  that 
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we  don’t  change  it  during  the  bidding.  We  call  this  the  private-value 
assumption.  The  model  also  assumes  that  we  care  only  about  getting 
the item as cheaply as possible, without regard  to who  else might win 
it. These  assumptions are not necessarily true. In practice, we may have 
only  a  vague  idea  of  what  our  valuation  might  be,  and  even  if  we  do 
have a  speciﬁc  value in  mind, we may be very prone to change it as we 
see how the bidding  goes. We may also be  anxious to keep the item out 
ofthe handsofcertainrivalbidders.Aperfectexampleofthelastmotive 
is providedbya Seinfeld  12  episodeinwhichthecharacter Elaineisasked 
by her boss to act  as  an  agent to bid  on a  set of  golf  clubs once owned 
by President John F. Kennedy.  She is given explicit  instructions  not to 
bid more than  $10,000, which is therefore  her valuation. But  she gets in 
a bidding  war with an irritating acquaintance, and runs the bidding up 
to  $20,000. 
1.4  Variations  on  the  English  Theme 
There  are  actually  several  ways  in  which  an  English  auction  can  be 
conducted,  as  pointed  out by Milgrom  and Weber  (1982). Up  to  now 
I  have  been  blurring  the  distinctions,  but  now  it  is  important  that 
I  describe  in  detail  the  two  main  variations  of  English  auctions  as 
they  occur  in  practice,  and  a  third  version  that  is  a  simple  and  clear 
abstraction  widely  adopted  in  the  theoretical  literature.  The  seemingly 
minor  differences in rules can  mean big  differences in  bidding  behavior. 
•	 The  ascending-price English  auction.W eh a v ea l r e a d yd e s c r i b e dt h e 
usual  picture, in which  the  auctioneer  orally solicits bids in  small 
incrementsfromthe bidders,who indicatetheirwillingnesstomeet 
a price with a wave of a paddle, or a nod of the head, or  some other, 
perhapsverysubtle,signal.Whatis importantin this modelis, ﬁrst, 
that  bidders  can  hide  their  identity  by  using  such  subtle  bidding 
moves.  Second,  jump  bids—bids  above  the  level being  solicited by 
the  auctioneer—are  not  allowed. 
12 For  those visiting from  another  planet, a popular TV sitcom  which aired  ﬁrst-run 
from  1989  to  1998,  but  which  is  often  shown  as  a  syndicated  rerun.  This  particular 
episode is titled “The Bottle Deposit,’’ and was  ﬁrst aired May 2, 1996  (season 7). 
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•	 The  English  outcry  auction.  An  alternative  is  the  English  outcry 
auction, in which bidders call out  their bids, or at  least are allowed 
to  do  so,  destroying  any  possibility  of  anonymity.  Note  that  this 
allows  jump  bidding,  the  real  difference  between  the  outcry  and 
ascending-price  English  auctions.  In  some  English  auctions,  such 
as  those you might  ﬁnd at  local  ﬂea  markets, for example, jump 
bidding is  not explicitly  forbidden, but is just  not customary. These 
outcry auctions  thus  become  ascending-price  English  auctions de 
facto.  What  matters  in  English  auctions  in  general,  and  in  many 
other  kinds  of  auctions,  are  the  kinds  of  signals  that  bidders  can 
send to competitors with  their  bidding. 
•	 The Japanese button  auction. A third  version of the English auction 
is  described  by  Cassady  (1967)  as  being  used  in  Japan.  In  this 
variation,  the  current  price  level  is  displayed  to  the  bidders  on  an 
ascending  electronic  clock. Each buyer has a button, and keeps her 
ﬁnger on it  until a level is reached at which she wishes to drop out, 
at which point  she (irrevocably) releases  her button. At  any given 
time,  there  are  two  important  pieces  of  information  available  to 
bidders:  the  current  price  level,  and  the  fact  that  the  clock  is  still 
moving  and  there  are  therefore  two  or  more  bidders  still  pressing 
their buttons. When only one  bidder is  left pressing a button,  the 
price  clock  stops  and  the  auction  is  over.  Milgrom  and  Weber 
(1982)  in  fact  reserve  the  term  “English  auction’’  for  this  kind  of 
auction,  but with  this additional  assumption: Bidders  are aware of 
who drops  out,  and when,  and  therefore know at  any time exactly 
how  many  bidders  are  active.  We  will  call  Milgrom  and  Weber’s 
model  the  Japanese button  auction.13  This  form  of  English  auction 
is  very  popular  among  theorists,  who  like  it,  I  suspect,  because 
13  Do  not  confuse  this  with  the  “Japanese  simultaneous-bidding  system,’’  which  is 
also  described by Cassady, but  which is quite  different. In  this  latter  kind of  auction, 
used in the Greater Tokyo  ﬁsh  markets, at  least when Cassady  was writing in  1967, all 
bids  are  made  simultaneously  using  hand  signals. According to  Cassady (p.  64),  “The 
bidding  starts  as  soon  as  the  auctioneer  gives  the  signal,  and  the  highest  bidder,  as 
determinedbythe auctioneer,isawardedthe lot.’’Complicationsarisewhenbidderstry 
to raise  their  bids  after  seeing  those of others,  and Cassady discusses  some of the  action: 
“The confusion  calls to mind the frenzied trading by brokers in the stock market, except 
that  there  is  only  one  auctioneer  in  the  simultaneous-bidding  system.’’ 
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it  enables  them  to  make  certain  precise  mathematical  statements 
and  prove  certain  theorems.  But  in  actual  fact  it  is  not  very 
common,  at  least  in  the  West,  and  the  information  about  the 
number of  active  bidders is usually  not accessible.14 
You  can  also  use  another,  equivalent  picture:  an  auctioneer  calls 
out  ascending  prices  with  small  increments  and  bidders  indicate 
their  willingness  to  pay  the  current  price  by  keeping  their  hands 
raised.  When  any  bidder  lowers  her  hand  it  means  she  is  no 
longer  interested,  and  the  item  is  sold  to  the  last  bidder  with  her 
hand raised, at  the price at  which  the next-to-last bidder dropped 
out (Krishna,  2002). Everyone  can  see everyone else’s  hands,  and 
changing your  mind (reentry) is  not  allowed. 
Throughout  this  book  I’ll  indicate,  when  it  matters,  which  model 
we  are  using  for  an  English  auction.  As  I’ve  mentioned,  economists 
especially  like  the  Japanese  button  auction  because  the  model  allows 
them  to  prove  things  that  are  not  generally  true  for  the  other  forms. 
This is  not  an  altogether corrupt  activity: it gives  us a chance to develop 
insight  and  intuition  by  developing  the  theory,  and  is  not  dangerous 
or  deceptive unless we  forget  our  assumptions,  or, for  that  matter,  the 
usual gap  between  theory and real  behavior in  the  ﬁrst  place. We’ll  next 
consider biddingstrategiesintheJapanese buttonversionoftheEnglish 
auction,  and  see  how  the  model,  while  somewhat  unrealistic,  enables  us 
to  introduce  some  very important  ideas. 
1.5  Truthful  Bidding  Is  Dominant  in  (Japanese  Button) 
English  Auctions 
Now return to the  theoretical setting in which we accept completely  the 
model  in  which  bidders  have  a  deﬁnite  valuation  for  the  item  under 
auction—have  private  values.  In  this  world  the  very  simple  and  intu­
itively clear strategy just  described in  section  1.3—bidding gradually up 
to your  value but no higher—is optimal in a very important way: it is at 
least  as good  as  any other  strategy,  no  matter  how other bidders  bid. 
14 It is certainly true  that the number of potential competitors for an item on eBay is 
both  interesting to  the bidder,  and  unknown. 
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To  see  this, we  ﬁrst  need to be  clear  about  the  criterion  for judging 
strategies. Deﬁne your  surplus  as  the  difference between your  valuation 
and  the price you pay:  valuation  minus price. For example, if you  place 
a value of  $100 on a coin and you  manage to buy it, when the  smoke 
clears, at  $75, you have  earned a  surplus of  $25. Ordinarily, we might 
say that your goal is to get the coin “as cheaply as possible.’’ But  now we 
will  use terminology that is a bit  more  formal: we  assume  that your goal 
is to  choose  a  strategy that  maximizes your  surplus. 
We  can  now  say something  precise  and  important  about  the  strategy 
oftruthful biddinginthebutton auction.Continuingwiththeexample, 
if you  stop  bidding (by  taking your  ﬁnger off your  button) when  the 
current  price  is  less  than  $100,  you  can  only  miss  an  opportunity  to 
gain  some  positive  surplus. Keeping your  ﬁnger on your  button keeps 
alive the chance of gaining surplus, and as much  surplus as possible. On 
the other  hand, if you  stay in  the  auction  past  $100, you risk winning 
and paying  more  than your  value,  thereby  earning a  negative surplus— 
that  is,  losing  surplus.  Thus,  the  strategy of  truthful  bidding,  which  in 
this  kind of  auction  means  taking your  ﬁnger off your  button precisely 
at  the  point  when  the  bidding  reaches  your  value,  is  no  worse  than 
any  alternative.  In  such  cases  we  say  that  the  strategy  is  dominant. 
The  qualiﬁed  term  “weakly  dominant’’  is  sometimes  used,  because 
there  is  no  guarantee  that  the  strategy is  always  strictly  better  than  any 
alternative. When we  can  ﬁnd a dominant strategy, we have effectively 
answered the  most  important  question  about  an  auction. 
Be  sure  you  understand  the  argument  in  the  preceding  paragraph 
with  crystal clarity. It is  one of the  most  important  and  beautiful  ideas 
in  auction  theory.  Vickrey  introduced  it  in  his  famous  1961  paper  in 
connection  with  sealed-bid  auctions,  which  we  will  discuss  in  the  next 
section. But ﬁrst I should explain why sincere bidding is  not  a dominant 
strategy in  the  English  outcry  or  ascending-price  auctions. 
Remember  that  a  strategy  is  (weakly)  dominant  if  no  strategy  is 
better, regardless of how rival bidders bid. Well, in the Japanese  button 
version  of the  English  auction,  there  is  no  way that  the  actions  of  a  rival 
can  affect  the  fact  that dropping  out  short of your  value or  staying in 
pastyour valuecanonlydecreasesurplus.Ourrivalisconstrainedbythe 
rules,asyouare,ofeitheracquiescingtothe currentbidlevelbykeeping 
his ﬁnger  on  his button,  or releasing it irrevocably.  The imaginary price 
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clock goes  up  smoothly (ignoring  the bidding  increments,  which  we 
assume are tiny), and no  matter when your rivals do or  don’t drop  out, 
you  should  simply  stay in  the  bidding  until your  value is reached,  and 
then drop  out yourself. 
But  now  suppose you  are  in  an  English  outcry  auction,  where jump 
bids are allowed. You  attach  a value of  $1000 to the item. Suppose now 
that a rival  bidder is a bit crazy, and hates the prices between $100 and 
$200.He adoptsthestrategyofjumpbiddingto$10,000if thereare bids 
in  this range. If you follow  the  bidding up to  some price between  $100 
and $200,youwilltrigger  thisweirdresponse, and miss theopportunity 
to buy  the item.  So what  should you do? Clearly, you  should jump­
bid  past  this  range  when  you  get  to  it,  preserving  the  opportunity  to 
buy below your  $1000  valuation. Such  a jump is  not consistent with 
the  prescription  of  gradual  increments  in  sincere  bidding,  and  thus 
sincere bidding is  not dominant in  the outcry auction. This  argument 
does  require  your  rival  to  behave  in  a  daffy  way,  but  remember  that 
dominanceisaverystrong notion:yourstrategyof sincerebiddingmust 
be bulletproof;itmustbeat leastasgoodasanyotherstrategyregardless 
of what your rivals do,  daffy  or  not. 
In  the  ascending-price  English  auction,  your  early  actions  can  still 
send signals to  other bidders. For example, in the early bidding you can 
eithersitonyour handsor bid. Thesevariationsin behavior,while more 
subtle  than  jump  bidding,  can  still,  conceivably,  affect  the  behavior 
of  rival  bidders,  as  in  the  outcry  auction  with  jump  bids.  The  same 
reasoning  as in  the jump-bidding  case  shows  that  sincere bidding in  the 
ascending-price  version  of the  English  auction  is  also  not  dominant. 
1.6  Sealed-Bid  Second-Price  (Vickrey)  Auctions 
Now  let’s  return  to  the  mail-bid  sales  mentioned  earlier.15  Suppose 
we  want  to  auction  off  an  item,  say  a  coin  illustrated  in  a  catalog,  by 
mail.  How  might  we  emulate  the  conditions  of  an  English  auction? 
15 The term  “sale’’ is often  used  instead of  “auction’’  when bids are collected  solely 
by  mail.  The  reason  seems  traceable  to  the  fact  that  “auctions’’  are  subject  to  legal 
regulation  and require  licensing of  the  auctioneer (Lucking-Reiley,  2000b). 
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Well,  when  does  the  bidding  stop  in  an  English  auction?  Assuming 
that  bidders are  bidding  sincerely,  this  happens precisely when  no  one 
is  willing  to  pay  more  than  the  current  high  bid,  which  means  that 
the  high  bidder  wins  the  item,  at  a  price  equal  to  the  second-highest 
valuation  among the bidders.  Based on  this  observation—a key point in 
Vickrey’s  1961  paper—we can  emulate an English auction  as a  sealed-
bid sale,  saya mail-bid  sale, in the following way.Bidders independently 
mail  in  their  bids  to  the  seller.  The  seller  then  awards  the  item  to  the 
highest  bidder,  who  pays  the  second-highest  bid.  This  second-highest 
bid  is  conventionally  called  the  second  price,  and  such  auctions  are 
called  second-price  auctions.  We  will  use  the  term  second-price  sealed-
bid  auction  (or,  interchangeably,  Vickrey  auction) to  mean  the  simplest 
possible  implementation  of  the  form,  with  no  conditions,  reserves, 
or  embellishments:  bidders  submit  sealed  bids,  and  the  seller  awards 
the  item.16 
How,  then,  should  you  behave  in  this  emulation  of  an  English 
auction? It should come  as  no surprise  that you  should emulate truthful 
bidding:  you  should  submit  a  bid  exactly  equal  to  your  value.  The 
argument  is  the  same  as  that  for  truthful  bidding  in  the  English 
auction:  If  you  submit  a  bid  less  than  your  value,  you  can  only  miss 
an  opportunity to pick up some surplus; and if you submit a bid greater 
than your  value, you risk losing  surplus in  the  case when you win  and 
the  second-highest bidder  has  also bid  above your  value.  Thus, truthful 
bidding  is  a  dominant  strategy  in  the  Vickrey  auction  as  well  as  the 
Japanese  button  auction—optimal  regardless  of  others’  strategies.  As 
Vickrey  also  points  out,  a  great  advantage  of  second-price  auctions 
follows from  the  fact  that a bidder  need  only  know  her value to  decide 
how to bid;  there is  no  calculation  necessary,  no  incentive to  bid other 
than truthfully. 
In  practice,  the  winner  of a  second-price  auction  is  usually  required 
to pay  a  bit  more  than  the  second-highest bid, by  a  small  amount  that 
represents  the tick,  the  increment in  bidding  that would  take  place were 
the  sale  conducted  orally  as  an  English  auction.  Mail-bid  sales  often 
16 Lucking-Reiley’s (2000b) historyof stamp  auctions shows that Vickrey was not the 
ﬁrst to  think of  the form,  although this is  not to downplay Vickrey’s  important role in 
essentially beginning  the game-theoretic analysis of  auctions. 
15 CHAPTER ONE 
use  a  ﬁxed  value  for  the  tick  of  5–10%,  although  a  sliding  scale  is 
also  used. 
Asmentionedbefore,conventionalEnglish ﬂoor auctionsofteninvite 
book  bids—bids  submitted by mail  or privately in advance of the  actual 
ﬂoor  auction. Such  a  mechanism represents a  marriage of  English  and 
Vickrey auctions. Here is  an example of “Instructions for Mail Bidders’’ 
from  the  catalog  of  a  prestigious  sale  of  ancient  coins  by  Numismatic 
Fine Arts, Inc.: 
Bid what you  feel  the  lot is worth to you. Your  bids will be executed 
by  Numismatic  Fine  Arts,  Incorporated.  The  lots  will  be  awarded 
to  the  highest  bidder  at  a  price  based  on  an  increment  of  5%  over 
the  next  highest  bid.  Thus,  even  if  your  mail  bid  is  40%  higher 
than the next highest  bid, you will buy the lot for only 5% over the 
underbidder.17 
This advice  closely foreshadows eBay’s advice for what they  call “proxy 
bidding’’  (as  we  will  see  in  section  3.2),  reﬂecting  eBay’s  natural 
ancestry. 
1.7  Mail-Bid  Auctions 
From  my own  experience,  second-price  mail-bid  sales  of ancient  coins 
were  common  at  least  from  the  1970s  to  the  advent  of  the  internet 
and  eBay.18 Lucking-Reiley (2000b)  traces  mail-bid  sales for  stamps 
back  to  the  1870s,  and  reports  that  the  earliest  second-price  mail-bid 
stamp  sale  he  was  able  to  ﬁnd  was  run  in  1893.  These  sales  had  the 
advantage  of  reaching  a  very  select  clientele  with  a  large  number  of 
items  at  one  time.  In  the  case  of  ancient  coins,  as  many  as  several 
hundred could be  included in one  list, often with photographs. In  fact, 
the  length  of  the  lists  was  often  determined  by  the  breakpoints  in  the 
postal  rates.  Such  a  business  could  be  very  labor  intensive,  involving 
17 Auction II, March 25–26, 1976, Beverly Hills, CA. This is an example of the well­
documented  and beautifully produced  auction  catalogs  that  are of  lasting  value to  the 
general  art and  antique  community. 
18 I thank the Reverend  Daniel C. Clark for some  history of  mail-bid  sales of ancient 
coins. 
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research, photography,  list preparation  and  production,  mailing  of  the 
lists, processing of payments,  and  mailing of  the items. Except for a few 
professional  dealers,  specializing  in  high-end  material,  the  enterprise 
was often a  labor of love. But  mail-bid auctions served to bring together 
very  narrow  segments  of  collector  populations  with  corresponding 
dealers,  and  were  good  examples  of  nearly  ideal  Vickrey  auctions. 
They also  anticipate  eBay,  which  is,  intentionally  or  not,  a  very logical 
development  as  an  adaptation  of  the  mail-bid  sale  to  the  real-time 
environment  of  the  internet.  We  will  pick  this  thread  up  in  the  next 
chapter,  but  we  conclude  this  chapter  with  a  quick  discussion  of  the 
relationship between  English  and Vickrey  auctions,  and  between  their 
two  natural  ﬁrst-price  counterparts. 
1.8  Weak  Strategic  Equivalence  of  (Japanese  Button) 
English  and Vickrey  Auctions 
The  Japanese  button  English  and  Vickrey  auctions  are  equivalent  in 
the following  sense.  If  we  adopt  the private-value  model (where every 
bidderiscertainofhervalue),thentruthfulbiddingis dominantinboth 
forms.Thatis,itisadominantstrategyforabiddertoremaininthebid­
ding up to, but  not  past,  her value in  the English  auction,  and to  submit 
her true value in  the Vickrey auction. It is  clear  that  the  outcomes of  the 
twoformswill thenbe identical;thesamebidderwillwinthe objectand 
paythe sameprice,andthereforetherevenuetothe sellerwillalsobethe 
same. In this  sense, and in this  sense only, we can say that the Japanese 
button  English  and  Vickrey  forms  are  equivalent,  but  the  statement 
must be  qualiﬁed by  saying  they  are  weakly  strategically  equivalent. 
The  reason  for  the  qualiﬁcation  “weakly’’  is  this.  Information  be­
comes  available  to  the  bidders  during  the  conduct  of  the  English 
auction,  information  that is  never available to  the bidders in a Vickrey 
auction. In  particular,  in  the Japanese  button  auction,  bidders  know 
when  rival  bidders  drop  out.  English  bidders  can  incorporate  such 
newly  arriving  information  into  their  strategies,  while  the  Vickrey 
bidders  cannot.  Thus,  the  two  kinds  of  auctions  can  easily  lead  to 
different  outcomes  in  practice,  and  are  strategically  equivalent  only  in 
the weak  sense  described here. 
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This  is  far  from  just  a  technical  point.  In  practice,  bidders  may 
very  well  behave  quite  differently  in  an  English  auction,  typically 
getting  carried  away  in  a  war,  as  Elaine  did  in  the  Seinfeld  auction  of 
John F. Kennedy’s  golf  clubs. It’s  also quite  possible  that  they become 
intimidated by  a jump bid,  which  is  its  psychological  purpose. For 
example,  in  the  Seinfeld  auction,  the  auctioneer  got  only  the  bids  he 
asked for—up to  the  point when  Elaine owned  the  high  bid of  $6500. 
The  auctioneer  then  called,  “Do I hear  $6600?  The president’s own golf 
clubs.  Leisure  life  at  Camelot.  .  .  .  $6500  going  once  .  .  .  ,’’  at  which 
point  Elaine’s  nemesis, Sue  Ellen Mishky, raised  her  paddle  and  orally 
bid  $8000.  This  jump  bid,  in  this  ﬁctitious  but  very plausible  scenario, 
did  the  very  opposite  of  intimidating  Elaine.  Gibbon’s  description 
of  Didius  Julianus  rising  “at  once  to  the  sum  of  .  .  .  ’’  suggests  that 
Didius’s  bid  was  also  a  jump  bid,  perhaps  the  earliest  ever  recorded. 
We  will  return  to  jump  bidding  when  we  discuss  eBay  strategies  in 
chapter 3. 
1.9  The  Four  Standard Auctions  and  Why  They  Are Two  Pairs 
In  the  ﬁrst-price  auction,  the  highest  sealed bid  takes  the  prize,  and  the 
winner  pays  her  full  bid,  not  the  second-highest.  The  open,  dynamic 
form  of  the  ﬁrst-price  auction  is  the  Dutch  or  descending-price  auction, 
which  we have already mentioned in  passing. In the Dutch auction, the 
price  starts higher than anyone is willing to pay (a judgement  that must 
be  made  by  the  auctioneer),  and  is  then  decreased  until  it  reaches  a 
price  that  someone  is  willing  to  pay.  This  can  be  implemented  orally, 
by successively  calling out lower and lower prices; or mechanically, by  a 
descending analog or digital “price  clock,’’ as shown in ﬁgure 1.4. Today 
the  winner  indicates  her  intention  to  buy  on  an  electronic  keyboard, 
but Cassady (1967, p. 32) reports that bidders in a seventeenth-century 
version  indicated  their  intention to  buy by yelling  “mine,’’  and  that  the 
auction  method  was  called  “mineing.’’ 
It  may  not  be  obvious  at  ﬁrst  blush,  but  the  ﬁrst-price  and  Dutch 
forms  are  even  more  closely  related  than  the  Vickrey  and  English.  In 
fact,  they  are  strategically  equivalent  in  the  strong  sense,  meaning  that 
a  bidder  in  the  two  forms  has  at  corresponding  points  in  the  sale 
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Figure 1.4  Sale  of  cut  ﬂowers  by  Dutch  clock  in  Aalsmeer,  Holland,  2003.  The 
present  market  (Bloemenveiling  Aalsmeer,  or BVA),  according  to  its  web  site 
(http://www.vba.nl/),  sells  more  than  20  million  ﬂowers  and  plants  and  turns  over 
6 million euros a day, all in 5 halls with 13  clocks. The web site provides some 
good  detail  about  the  Dutch  auction  rules:  “Auctioning  at  the  VBA  goes 
according  to  the  system  of  ‘Dutch  Auction.’  This  means  that  the  clocks  run  from 
the  highest  to  the  lowest  price,  which  is  always  per  unit—that  is,  per  single  ﬂower 
or  plant.  When  this  process  takes  place,  the  buyer  sees  the  lights  around  the 
clock’s  edge  run  back  from  100  to  1.  If  a  buyer  notices  a  product  he  wants  to 
buy  at  a  price  which  agrees  with  him,  he  quickly  pushes  the  button  and  the  clock 
stops  at  the  desired  price.  If  the  number  of  the  buyer  appears  on  the  clock  face, 
it  means  that  the  buyer  was  the  ﬁrst  to  stop  the  clock  and  therefore  he  is  the 
buyer.  At  the  same  time  he  tells  the  auctioneer,  using  his  headset  with 
microphone,  how  much  of  the  consignment  he  wants  to  buy  (the  auctioneer 
determines  the  minimum  amount).  The  remainder  of  the  consignment  is  put  up 
for  auctioning  again. ...Per  clock,  some  1,500  transactions  can be processed 
per  hour.’’  (Jerrold  Patz,  www.patz.com) 
19 CHAPTER ONE 
exactly  the  same  decisions  to  make,  and  exactly  the  same  information 
on  which  to  base  those  decisions.  In  this  case,  a  bidder,  knowing 
her  value  and  nothing  else,  must  choose  one  number,  her  bid—and 
that  is  her  only  decision.  In  the  ﬁrst-price  auction,  she  submits  this 
number  as  a  sealed  bid.  In  the  Dutch  auction,  she  must  wait  until 
the  price  clock  descends  to  this  number  and  then  buy;  if  the  item 
is  sold  before  the  clock  reaches  her  intended  bid,  then,  well,  there  is 
nothing lefttothink about and no furtherchoicestomake—the auction 
is  over. 
The  strong  strategic  equivalence  between  ﬁrst-price  and  Dutch  is 
a  logical  equivalence,  but  not  a  psychological  equivalence.  In  a  ﬁrst-
price  auction, time is  not a signiﬁcant  factor, while in a Dutch auction, 
time,  dictating  the  descent  of  the  price  clock,  must  be  the  focus  of 
the  bidder’s  attention.  An  anxious  or  impatient  Dutch  bidder  may 
jump  the  gun  and  overpay,  or  a  cold-blooded  bidder  may  dare  to 
stare  the  clock  down  past  her  calculated  bid  and,  on  the  average,  risk 
losing  surplus. A ﬁrst-price bidder is not subject to  these psychological 
pressures in the cool  abstraction of  a  sealed-bid  auction. There is good 
experimental  evidence  to  support  the  view  that  people  do,  in  fact, 
behave  differently  in  the  two  settings,  despite  the  logical  equivalence.19 
It may be surprising  that  laboratory  experiments yield higher prices in 
the ﬁrst-priceauction,conﬂictingwith the argument thatDutchbidders 
may lack  patience.  Field experiments do, however, yield higher  bidding 
in  the  Dutch  format,  as  we  will  discuss  further  in  chapter  6.  These 
puzzles  and  paradoxes  of  behavior  come  up  all  the  time,  which  is  one 
reason  auctions  are  so  interesting. 
Think  of  it  this  way:  Writing  longhand  with  pencil  and  paper  is 
strongly  strategically  equivalent  to  typing  on  a  computer  keyboard. 
At  any  point,  the  writer  must  choose  the  next  letter,  number,  or 
punctuation  mark,  and  that is  the only decision  the writer must  make. 
But the  psychological  settings  of the  two  situations  are  different,  and  so 
may be  the practical results. 
To  summarize,  the  four  standard  kinds  of  auctions  form  two  pairs: 
(second-price)-English,  and  (ﬁrst-price)-Dutch, with  stronger kinship 
in  the  latter case than in the  former. 
19 See appendix D for a brief review of  auction experiments in the laboratory. 
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1.10  Disincentives  to Truthful  Bidding 
The  equivalence  between  English  and  Vickrey  auctions,  already  qual­
iﬁed  as  weak,  is  even  shakier  than  suggested  above  by  the  example 
of  Elaine’s  frenzy.  In  a  Vickrey  auction,  the  bidder  is  called  upon  to 
reveal  her  true  valuation,  and  there  are  two  important  reasons  why 
she  may  be  reluctant  to  do  so  (Rothkopf,  Teisberg,  and  Kahn,  1990; 
RothkopfandHarstad, 1995). First, thebid-takermaycheatbyinserting 
a  ﬁctitious  bid  between  the  actual  second-highest  and  the  highest, 
thus  increasing  his  revenue  and  decreasing  the  surplus  of  the  winning 
bidder.  Second,  the  information  about  the  bidder’s  actual  valuation 
may  be  useful  to  the  seller  in  future  interactions  with  the  buyer.  For 
example, suppose a bidder wins a  mail-bid  sale  and  her bid is  $200  for 
an  Alexandrian  coin  that  sells  for  the  second-highest  bid  of  $20.  This 
suggests  to  the  seller  that  he  may  be  able  to  extract  a  much  higher 
price  for  a  similar  coin  the  next  time  he  might  offer  one,  and  he 
will  accordingly  set  a  high  reserve  on  it.20  It  may  even  happen  that 
an  unusually  high  bid  attracts  the  attention  of  the  bid-taker  before 
t h ea u c t i o n  i so v e r ,w h om i g h tt h e ns t u d yt h ei t e mm o r ec l o s e l y , 
and,  if  he  ﬁnds  it  to  be  a  “sleeper’’  (that  is,  a  valuable  item  that 
has  previously  gone  unnoticed),  withdraw  it  from  the  sale  (Lucking-
Reiley,  2000b). If for  these or  other reasons the bidder is worried  about 
revealing  her  true  valuation,  the  general  effect  is  for  her  to  adjust 
her  strategy  by  bidding  less,  thus  lowering  the  expected21  proﬁt  of 
the  seller.  These practical considerations—the  possibility that  the  bid-
taker  may  cheat  or  use  the  information  later—are  not  intrinsic  to  the 
mathematical  model,  and  are  examples  of  what  auction  theorists  call 
“externalities.’’ 
Notice,  however,  that  in  an  English  auction  the  bidder  is  not  called 
on to reveal  her true value; she  just  matches the  second-highest bidder 
until  he  drops  out.  This  argument  is  used  by  Rothkopf  et  al.  (1990) 
20 More  about reserves later. 
21  I’ll  use  the term “expected’’  in  this  way  throughout  the  book and you  can  think 
of “expected proﬁt,’’ for example, as  meaning  intuitively the “average proﬁt over  many 
auctions.’’ See  section  A.3  for a technical  deﬁnition of  expected value. 
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and Rothkopf  and Harstad (1995) to explain  what  they  consider  to 
be  the  rarity  of  Vickrey  auctions  in  practice,  at  least  in  markets  for 
noncollectibles.We  should point out however,  that bid-taker cheating is 
not only possible, but not at all uncommon in English  auctions as well, 
as  evidenced  by  the  generous  stock  of  terminology.  The  two  standard 
ways  are  the  use  of  confederates,  or  shills ;  and  recognizing  phantom 
bids,  called  trotting,  running,  lift-lining,  taking  bids  off the  wall,o r  from 
the  chandelier,o r  from  the  order book  (Cassady,  1967; Ashenfelter  and 
Graddy,  2002).22 By the way, according to Cassady, if an  auctioneer has 
one legitimate bid  and invents  another,  it’s  called  “one-legged’’ trotting, 
and  when  he  has  no  legitimate  bids  and  invents  two,  it’s  called  “two­
legged’’ trotting. 
We turn next to eBay, an  auction form that we will argue is the logical 
extension of  the  English  and Vickrey auctions to  the  internet. We will 
see  that  eBay  plays  the  role  of  a  trusted  third  party,  and  in  this  way 
eliminates  some of  the problems described  above  that mitigate  against 
truthful  bidding. But the use of  shills by sellers is endemic to eBay, and 
we  will discuss  them  in  due  course. 
1.11  Questions 
1.  Find examples of auctions in ﬁlm, TV, or literature. For each  exam­
ple, determine, if possible,  the exact  form of  the  auction,  and evaluate 
how realistically you  think  the  participants behave. 
2.  We  mentioned  that  in  ancient  Babylon,  undesirable  women  were 
sold to the buyer who would accept the lowest dowry. Explain why this 
can be considered  a reverse  auction, which is  usually  thought of  as  an 
auction  with  one  buyer  and  many sellers. 
3.  Estimate how much Didius Julianus  paid  for  the Roman  Empire in 
current United  States  dollars. Ed  Finn  did  some  scholarly research  for 
22 For  a  discussion  of  the  way  the  conventional  patter  of  auctioneers  is  reﬂected 
online in  eBay,  see J. Boyd’s “Virtual  orality: How eBay  controls  auctions  without an 
auctioneer’s  voice’’  (2001). 
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my  class  in  2002,  and  estimated  the  cost  to  be  $3.75  billion.  I  like  his 
comment  on  Didius’s  fate: 
In  terms  of  auctions,  however,  this  story  reveals  an  important  real­
life rule. While  individuals  may be  able to  name a  monetary private 
value  for  anything,  certain  items  do  not  operate  under  the  laws  of 
economic  logic.  Auctions  rely  on  the  concept  of  possession,  which 
does  not  apply  well  to  intangibles  like  love  or  the  Roman  Empire. 
The  imperial  throne  was  not  the Praetorians’ to  sell,  and  Didius  was 
certainly  incapable  of  owning  it. 
4.  I  notice  that  eBay  recently  added  a  sales  mode  called  “Best  Offer.’’ 
The item description invites  the potential buyer to submit an offer,  with 
the following  warning: 
Make  this  offer your  Best  Offer. You can  only  make 1  offer  on  this 
item. 
and  the following agreement in a  click-through box: 
I  understand  that  my  Best  Offer  price,  including  any  Additional 
Terms I have  speciﬁed  is  binding. If the  seller  accepts  the  offer, I am 
obligated to  purchase  the Item. I also  understand  that  the Additional 
T e r m sIa d da sap a r to fm yB e s tO f f e r  m a yb er e v i e w e db ye B a yi na n 
effort to  prevent fraudulent  activity. 
Doesthisformof auctioncorrespondexactlytooneofthefour standard 
f o r m sd i s c u s s e di nt h i sc h a p t e r ?I fn o t ,w h a tf o r mi si tc l o s e s tt o ,a n d 
what  are  the  differences? When  might a  seller choose  this form? What 
kind of “fraudulent  activity’’ do you  think eBay is worried  about? How 
do you  think you  should bid  in  such  an  auction,  assuming you  know 
your  value? 
5.  eBay  is  the  dominant  online  auction  in  most  of  the  world,  but 
Japan  and  China  are  important  exceptions.  Yahoo!  dominates  eBay 
in  Japan,  and  Taobao  is  ﬁghting  it  out  with  eBay  in  China.  Try  to 
explain  the reasons  for  the  success of Yahoo!  and Taobao in  penetrating 
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these  internet  auction  markets  by  studying  their  business  histories 
and  practices,  rules,  rate  structures,  feedback  reputation  systems,  and 
interfaces.  To  what  extent  can  their  relative  success  be  attributed  to 
cultural  differences? For  several  relevant  papers in a recent conference, 
see  the  Proceedings  of  the  7th  International  Conference  on  Electronic 
Commerce,  ACM  International  Conference  Proceeding  Series,  ACM 
Press; vol.  113, Xi’an, China, August  15–17,  2005. 
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